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The virus of management -  
A viral perspective on bureaucracy and scientific management  
Christian Frankel & Peter Kjær 
Department of Organization and Industrial Sociology, Copenhagen Business School 
Abstract 
The virus metaphor may be used in studies of management knowledge not only as a way of 
describing diffusion processes but also as a way of thinking about viral elements of knowledge 
production. In the present article, organizational viruses are viewed as ensembles of basic 
distinctions that are constitutive of concrete bodies of knowledge and which form mutable engines 
of organizational self-descriptions. Organizational viruses, we contend, are both characterized by 
stability in terms of their basic productive configuration, while at the same time allowing for a high 
degree of variation in terms of concrete management knowledge and practice. The article is 
structured as follows. After the introduction, we first develop the notion of organizational virus as 
into an analytical approach. Second, we discern in the work of Frederick Taylor on scientific 
management and Max Weber on bureaucracy, two quite distinct viral configurations that we claim 
have infected most modern management knowledge – both on a discursive level and on the level of 
concrete organizational self-descriptions and practice. Third, we discuss our findings and raise the 
question of how viruses ‘work’, how they interact, and why they become infectious.  
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1. Introduction 
 
“Language is a virus” – W.S. Burroughs 
 
20 years ago Paul J. DiMaggio and Walter W. Powell published their seminal paper on institutional 
isomorphism “The Iron Case Revisited. Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in 
Organizational Fields” (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). Since 1983, the concept of isomorphism has 
set the agenda for much research, under the broad heading of “neo-institutionalism”, on the 
diffusion of organizational forms, organizational models and management knowledge. One 
particularly intense debate spurred by the isomorphism concept has been concerned with whether 
there is homogeneity – or, looking more closely, if there is in fact much more diversity than 
seemingly postulated by DiMaggio and Powell (e.g. Czarniawska and Sevon 1996).  
 
We do not intend to adjudicate between these positions but rather that there might be a much higher 
level of isomorphism than hitherto imagined, while at the same time recognizing that the 
possibilities for variation are also immense. We do this via the metaphor of organizational virus. 
The virus metaphor is by no means new in debates on diffusion and isomorphism (see e.g. Rogers 
1962; March and Olsen 1989, p. 59; Pastor, Meindl et al. 1998) where the metaphor has been used 
to describe diffusion processes as epidemics, i.e. how the spread of ideas, models, or technologies 
can be seen as a question of “contagion”. However, we intend to move attention away from the 
diffusion of already established social facts to the engines producing the social facts. 
 
The debate on isomorphism has tended to focus on homogeneity on the level of already established 
social facts, either as formal organizational structure or as particular semantics. Thus studies of 
isomorphism have noted e.g. the spread of the multidivisional corporation as a formal organization 
structure and the spread of the vocabulary and associated technologies of e.g. Business Process 
Engineering or Total Quality Management as a ‘model’ or ‘concept’ of management (e.g. Røvik 
1998, p. 149).  
 
An organizational virus we define as a basic and productive configuration of distinctions around a 
problem to be solved. A virus is not an organizational form, a model or an idea but a mutable 
engine of organizational reflection that become part of managerial knowledge and practice. It is 
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nothing in itself but should be seen as a simple and infectious pattern that requires a host in order 
for it to function and reproduce.  
 
We contend that most, if not all, forms of managerial knowledge are infected and hence produced 
by a limited number of highly productive viruses. Especially two viruses are almost universally 
disseminated in the modern world of organization and management: the virus of bureaucracy and 
the virus of scientific management. We choose to focus narrowly on these two viruses, leaving out 
other possible viruses for the time being.  
 
The viruses of bureaucracy and of scientific management coexist in most forms of managerial 
knowledge and organizational practice thus opening a particular field of conflict, variation and 
paradox in the production of social facts. In other words, what we recognize as diversity and 
variation can to a certain extent be interpreted as the productive outcome of a limited number of 
organizational viruses that are capable of producing a great variety of organizational forms and 
facts. Hence we may suggest that the viral gaze – focusing on the productive – is able to analyze 
constitutive relations of isomorphism and variety. 
 
More specifically, the ambition of the present article is to introduce the concept of organizational 
virus and, using this concept to elicit the viral elements of “bureaucracy” and “scientific 
management”, to discuss how these two viruses work, interact, and infect modern management 
knowledge.  
 
In the following we first open up a field of ‘viral analysis’ by suggesting how management 
knowledge may be observed in terms of organizational viruses – and by describing the key elements 
of viral configurations. We then turn to a reading of the work of Max Weber on bureaucracy and 
Frederick Taylor on scientific management and try to ‘boil down’ these two bodies of knowledge to 
the most simple configurations of distinctions: the virus of bureaucracy and the virus of scientific 
management. We end our paper giving a short discussion of the two viruses and how they become 
productive, how they are both mutually dependent and in constant conflict, and why they are so 
infectious. 
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2. The viral gaze 
The main challenge of the viral gaze is to observe productivity: to observe viruses as engines, 
establishing social facts. This challenge is to some degree taken up by constructivist strains within 
institutional theory (e.g. Hasselbladh and Kallinikos (2000) but also Fligstein (1990; 1996) and 
Kjær and Pedersen (2001)). However, in general the interest is on what social facts are produced 
and disseminated, more so than on how social facts are produced. In order to observe the 
productivity of viruses, we will supplement institutional theory with concepts taken from discourse 
analysis and autopoietic systems theory. These are both theories, which focus on communication. 
Just like Burroughs, they build on the assumption that ‘language is a virus’: we are infected by it 
and cannot escape it. The way we are and the way we see ourselves is infected by language. Indeed, 
both discourse analysis and systems theory radicalize the statement of Burroughs by stating that the 
social is basically communication: Social facts are communicative facts.1  
 
Studying organizational viruses, we choose to raise the question of how organizations become facts 
for themselves. Organizations, we view as specific orders of communication. Organizations are, in 
our view, characterized by being basically reflective. This means that however an organization may 
be organized, it holds the property of reflecting upon itself. This reflection may be rudimentary, but 
often it is both explicit and developed. This basic reflectivity implies that organizations develop 
self-descriptions, and that self-descriptions are constitutive2 for the ongoing recreation of the 
organization. This is where organizational viruses enter organizations: organizational viruses form 
the self-production of organizations by enabling and giving directions to self-descriptions of 
organizations (Luhmann 1984, ch. 11; Luhmann 1988). 
 
Organizational viruses, we understand as a set of distinctions, tied together by a (general) problem 
to which the organization is an answer. Thereby the organization becomes object of management in 
a specific way, as the organization emerges for itself as a horizon of ways to handle the problem. At 
this point, the viral gaze differs from institutional studies of isomorphism: where institutional 
                                                 
1 In both systems theory and discourse analysis, generative or productive mechanisms are stressed. However, there are 
also examples, where either of the two perspectives are used to analyze or conceptualize what is generated. For an 
overview see Andersen (2003). 
2 That self-descriptions are constitutive is not to say that they are determining for the specific organization.  
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studies typically focus on isomorphism in the horizon of possible solutions, the viral gaze focuses 
on isomorphism in the general and horizon-producing problematizations. 
 
The viral gaze on organizations hereby implies a functionalism. However, this functionalism is not 
located on the level of a general theory of organizations, such as theories suggesting that 
organizations are formed to solve efficiency problems or problems of coordination. Rather, the 
functionalism is located at an analytical level: The viral gaze observes how organizations observe 
themselves as functional solutions to specific problems. Common for viruses is hence that they 
infect organizations with functionalist self-descriptions.  
 
An organizational virus, we suggest, is a set of distinctions, held together by yet another distinction, 
formed as a problem. This composition of distinctions makes it possible for the virus to figure at 
societal, discursive levels as well as at organizational levels. The problem is, in other words, both 
constructed as a general societal problem, and at the same time constructed in a way, which makes 
it easy for organizations to adopt viruses as part of their own problematization. Viruses may hence 
spread both directly from organization to organization or via societal discourses.  
 
As mentioned the virus is composed by a set of distinctions. Probably the most important is the 
distinction is that of problem and solution. The virus gives a general formulation of what problem is 
to be solved by organization. However, the answer is left open. This openness is central to the 
productiveness of the virus: The virus produces organizational facts by directing the organizational 
attention to certain problems and producing a seemingly endless horizon of possible solutions. 
However, there is also a commonality between the solutions, namely in how the organization is 
made observable. To reiterate: by posing a specific problem, the organization is made an object in a 
specific way. Hence the two first questions asked by the viral gaze is how organizational viruses 
• define a general problem to be solved by organization? and 
• how the organization thereby can become an object for itself? 
 
The latter question is important, because it sheds light on how the organization becomes 
manageable. Only by becoming object for themselves, organizations can manage themselves, and 
the way it becomes object for itself, conditions how management can manage.  
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The virus also has implications in terms of power and expectation. Power has to do with force, and 
designates the energy making the ongoing constitution of organizations possible.3 Needles to say, 
power in modern organizations rarely takes the form of sheer violence. Rather, power is 
transformed. Our argument is that this transformation is central to the productivity of viruses: The 
way the organization problem is posed transforms power in such a way that power is capable of 
contributing to solutions to the problem. The same goes for expectation. Any organization, indeed 
any societal order, may be characterized by the form of expectation (Luhmann 1984, p. 436 ff). In 
general terms this expectation may either be normative or cognitive. The two forms of expectations 
differ with respect to what happens if the expectation is not met4. If the expectation changes, we call 
the form of expectation cognitive. In this case, expectation is adjusted and we may talk of learning. 
However, often when expectations are not met, the expectation is still upheld, e.g. when we observe 
a car driving in the wrong direction, against traffic. It is unexpected, yet afterwards, we still expect 
cars to follow the direction of traffic. This form of expectation is normative. The form of 
expectation is central to the virus, because expectations provide organizations with structure. Hence 
by configuring expectation, the virus also configures the organizational possibilities of structuring 
itself. Seen together, power and expectation are the conditions of organizational creation and 
stabilization, respectively. 
 
Hence the viral gaze asks how organizational viruses 
• specify how power is to be related to this organization? and 
• specify a general orientation of expectations in this organization? 
 
By asking these four questions, we intend to shed light on the four elements of organizational 
viruses. Organizational viruses may hence be illustrated a follows. 
 
                                                 
3 Needless to say, here we are deeply inspired by foucauldian conceptualizations of power, emphasizing power as a 
productive force. 
4 This may also be termed ‘disappointment’. However, disappointment is here to be understood as a technical term, and 
not as a term for the sensual, often unhappy, reaction to unmet expectations 
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The organizational virus:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It seems to us that ‘scientific management’ and ‘bureaucracy’ are the two most widespread viruses. 
Viewed as viruses, bureaucracy and scientific management are as prevalent today as they are 
unfashionable and infamous. The two viruses incubated under these names have indeed caused 
epidemics so encompassing that they hardly are perceivable anymore. When almost all management 
and thinking of management is infected, it becomes very challenging to make apparent how 
encompassing the infection is and with what effects. We believe this challenge can be met by 
focusing on the early formulations of ‘scientific management’ and ‘bureaucracy’. The temporal 
distance and the distance to current management thinking, make it possible to distance ourselves 
from the viruses we are infected by, and hence reaching a diagnosis. This is what we pursue in the 
following section. 
3. Analysis 
3.1 Weber 
Max Weber condensed encompassing studies into a relatively brief text on bureaucracy (Weber 
1971, pp. 105-158). The text is sparse in terms of references. It is rather the systematic and 
familiarity than the load of academic references which makes the article convincing. Counter to 
what is sometimes postulated, Weber is not an advocate of bureaucracy, rather he intends to 
diagnose the organizational form he found widespread in public and private organizations (see 
Byrkjeflot (2000) on (mis)readings of Weber). He termed this form of organization ‘bureaucracy’ 
because it was centered on paperwork in offices. In spite of it being a fairly well known form of 
organization, we shall briefly recap Weber’s analysis in order to answer the four questions raised 
above.  
 
Problem 
Object 
Power 
Expectation 
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The main mark of bureaucracy is formalization, i.e. “the reduction of modern office management to 
rules” (Weber, Shafritz et al. 2001, p. 81). This goes for the employment of people, the division of 
work, the levels of hierarchy, the areas of responsibility and competency as well as procedures. 
‘Formalization’ points us to the problem to which the organization is a solution. In some respects 
the solution is namely formalization. The problem, which rings through the pages of Weber’s 
analysis, is arbitrariness, e.g. “individual privileges and bestowals of favor” (Weber, Shafritz et al. 
2001, p. 81). Arbitrariness is a problem because it makes rational action difficult, not to say 
impossible. Arbitrariness is incalculable, whereas rationality requires calculability. Hence the 
formalization of organization is to establish a calculable frame, which enables rationality. 
Arbitrariness is also a problem insofar as it implies change or instability. Hence formalization is to 
be relatively stable, and thereby provide a frame for rationality over time. Rationality does not only 
imply that something is calculable now, it should also be possible to do the same calculation at 
another point in time. Hence formal rationality, as described by Weber, is characterized by 
detemporalization (Luhmann 1982). Temporal context should be secondary in questions of 
rationality.  
 
Formalization obviously makes the organization object for itself in a quite specific way, namely as 
rules and rule-based action. More specifically we may talk of decisions. By emerging for itself as 
decisions, the organization becomes manageable: It manages by decision, and it manages how 
decisions are taken. Decisions are here characterized by being visible and explicit selections. 
Decisions are documented, and documents are given a flow, which links various parts of the 
organization. 
 
When power is taken into consideration from the bureaucratic point of view, it becomes a problem 
exactly because it is arbitrary. Power typically becomes visible e.g. in decisions, which are not 
expected outcome of a calculation.5 One of the important tasks of bureaucracy is hence to transform 
power and make it calculable. This is done by making power itself calculating: power becomes 
authority, and authority is formally assigned to positions in the bureaucracy, having authority in 
certain areas and according to certain procedures. Compartmentalization of authority does not only 
                                                 
5 In this perspective power often becomes visible as a deviance from rationality: when a decision taken seems irrational, 
it may be asked whom the decision favors, and hence what actors have ‘flexed their muscles’ to make the decision turn 
out that way.  
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delimit the possibility of the inferior positions in the hierarchy to abuse authority. It does also 
delimits the possibility of superior positions to arbitrarily overrule decisions taken by inferior 
positions. In other words: the compartmentalization of authority at the same time imposes 
restrictions and provides (specified) autonomy for each position in the organization (REF).  
 
When it comes to expectation, formalization as solution to arbitrariness clearly favors normative 
expectation. Normative expectation is at the heart of establishing calculability. When unexpected 
decisions are made, it is to be inquired whether the decisions are made according to the rules (i.e. 
other decisions).  Of course, cognitive expectation does also play a role. The inquiry may e.g. show 
that the decision is not in breach with the general rules of the organization, and hence that the 
general rules are to be understood in new, unexpected ways.6 However, the normative expectation 
plays the central role, as confidence in the general rules must be restored if in jeopardy.  
 
We may summarize our first analysis with the following illustration.  
 
The bureaucratic virus:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It is remarkable that the bureaucratic virus spurns of organizational self-descriptions, according to 
which the organization is not so much the result of rationality (rationalization), but rather a 
precondition of rationality. Formal rationality, in focus here, is namely characterized by requiring a 
spatial view of the organization. By detemporalizing and compartmentalizing the organization in 
                                                 
6 This is typically a local phenomenon: one office in a hierarchy may hence generate knowledge of how specific rules 
are to be interpreted. 
How to avoid arbitrariness by formalization 
Decisions 
as object 
Power 
Expectation 
Authority 
Normative
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positions, offices (bureaus), jurisdictions, Vorgesetzter (all spatial concepts) the organization draws 
a spatial image of itself.  
3.2 Taylor 
Taylor is well known for advocating for ‘scientific management’ as a specific way to make 
organizations efficient. To Taylor the efficiency issue was not something that just concerned 
industrial managers but something that involved individuals, companies and society at large. Thus 
the problem was formulated as a general problem of waste – amendable to a host of concrete 
instances. In his introduction to ‘The Principles of Scientific Management’, Taylor elaborates on the 
problem of ‘waste’ in consonance with President Theodore Roosevelt: 
 
“We can see our forests vanishing, our water-powers going to waste, our soil being 
carried by floods into the sea; and the end of our coal and our iron is in sight. But our 
larger wastes of human effort, which go on every day through such of our acts as are 
blundering, ill-directed, or inefficient, and which Mr. Roosevelt refers to as a lack of 
‘national efficiency,’ are less visible, less tangible, and are but vaguely appreciated.”  
(Taylor 1998 [1911])  
 
The general problem spelled out here is waste of human effort. The problem of waste thus has to be 
dealt with to attain efficiency. However, the answer to the problem of waste – what has come to be 
known as scientific management – is not simply a technical solution. Taylor specifically underlines 
that scientific management  
 
“… is no efficiency device, nor is it any group of efficiency devices. Scientific … It is 
no one of the various elements by which it is commonly known, by which people refer 
to it. It is not time study nor man study. … Scientific management does not exist and 
cannot exist until there has been a complete mental revolution.” (Taylor 2001 [1916])  
 
This revolution is one of how to observe work and work organization. It is to be a scientific 
observation. One famous example of such scientific observation is the ‘science of shoveling’ 
(Taylor 2001 [1916], p. 67f), a science which entails close examination of shovels and shovel 
techniques. The traditional method of shoveling is contrasted with other possible methods for 
shoveling, the traditional shovel is contrasted with new forms of shovels etc. By experimenting in 
 Page 12/18 
The virus of management.doc?sid=U33SOHoV2l0&mbox=Inbox&charset=escaped_unicode&uid=60&number=4&filename=The virus of 
management.doc 
such ways, comparisons are created, and the actual way the work is done, is contrasted to possible 
ways to do the work. Hence we arrive at the more specific problem, set by the scientific 
management virus, namely how to avoid waste by comparing actual to possible forms of 
organization?  
 
As already pointed out, the organization hereby becomes object for itself as ‘human effort’, i.e. 
‘work’. Taylor discusses ‘work’ predominantly as physical work, as in the shoveling example 
above. However, ‘work’ can encompass an endless list of physical as well as mental activities.7 
Indeed, we may even ask how a specific organization works? Hence, organizations can become 
object for themselves as work in a great variety of ways.  
 
This ‘scientific observation’ is closely linked to cognitive expectation. When scientific management 
e.g. compares traditional (actual) ways to work with possible ways to work, knowledge “in the 
heads of the workmen” (Taylor 2001 [1916], p. 65) is to be recorded, ordered, analyzed. The 
knowledge is to be made explicit and tested in experiments. It is, in other words, systematically 
tried to test expectations in order for the organization to learn, i.e. a systematic utilization of 
cognitive expectation. Of course, normative expectation does also play a role. The predominant 
cognitive expectation is to spurn of (preliminary) ‘best ways’ to do e.g. shoveling, and these best 
ways are to be formed into rules.  
 
The experimentation and gathering of information requires a division of work, and this brings us to 
the power question. Simply put, one part does the shoveling, whereas another part observes, 
analyzes and organizes how the shoveling is to be done. However, it is important that this division 
of work between worker and superior is not seen as a hierarchical structure, where certain (more or 
less arbitrary) tasks are assigned to the specific worker. It is rather seen as a way to organize 
scientific enlightenment of work processes, an organization to the benefit of all parties, and hence 
not a question of power or authority, but of rationality. The “Boss” is to be converted to a “teacher” 
                                                 
7 In an interesting correlate to his initial posing of the problem of waste as general social problem, the principles of 
scientific management were also seen as: ”…applicable to all kinds of human activities, from our simplest individual 
acts to the work of our great corporations, which call for the most elaborate cooperation.” Taylor, F. W. (1998 [1911]). 
The Principles of Scientific Management. Mineola, New York, Dover. 
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who “is not an enemy, but a friend” of the worker. “He comes there to try to help the man get 
bigger wages …” (Taylor 2001 [1916], p. 70). What we find here is not power primarily in the form 
of violence, nor primarily in the form of authority, but in the form of rationality. The virus 
transforms power into rationality. The scientific management virus is illustrated below.  
 
The scientific management virus:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It is remarkable that the scientific management virus spurns of organizational self-descriptions, 
which focus on activity, work, processes, sequences. Such self-descriptions may take the form of 
time studies, where physical work processes are analyzed by decomposing them to basic units of 
actions. However, the virus opens up for temporal images in general, and hence for self-descriptions 
focusing on intellectual work processes, organizational work processes, symbol manipulation work 
processes etc. And all these temporal self-descriptions can become ‘scientific observations’, i.e. 
observations where actual organization is compared to possible organization. 
4. Discussion 
Research on management knowledge may benefit from using the virus metaphor – in at least two 
different ways. On one hand, the metaphor may be used to describe diffusion processes as a process 
of contagion. On the other hand, the metaphor may be used to describe the basic configurations of 
knowledge that form mutable engines of organizational self-descriptions. In the present article we 
attend to the latter aspect by outlining an analytics for the description of organizational viruses. 
Organizational viruses, we contend, are ensembles of basic distinctions that are constitutive of 
How to avoid waste by comparing actual to
possible forms of organization? 
Work 
as object 
Power 
Expectation 
Rationality 
Cognitive 
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concrete bodies of knowledge, and which can be characterized in terms of their fundamental 
definitions of organizational problems, objects of attention, power and expectation.  
 
In our analysis of two dominant viruses of management knowledge, we found that bureaucracy as 
first described by Max Weber, and scientific management as propagated by Frederick Taylor, could 
be characterized as two distinct viral configurations. Bureaucracy, being organized around a 
problem of arbitrariness, makes decisions a key object of organizational attention, and works by 
making power into authority and favoring normative expectations. Scientific management, being 
organized around a problem of waste, makes work an object of attention drawing on a conception of 
power as rationality and favoring cognitive expectations. Taken together, bureaucracy produces 
spatial conceptions of organization (a space for rationality), whereas scientific management 
produces temporal conceptions of organization (a process of rationalization of concrete operations 
or work processes).  
 
At this juncture our viral analysis allows us to raise at least three issues for further debate: 
 
Stability and change. Initially we claimed that the two viruses infect most management thinking. In 
saying this we want to highlight how they are not to be seen as organizational models but as 
“drivers” in the production of knowledge permeating almost all developed organizational self-
descriptions – and broader managerial discourses. As students of TQM, BPR and similar 
organizational recipes have noted, there are strong remnants of scientific management (Hagedorn-
Rasmussen 2003) – and bureaucracy in both, but even notions of career development, corporate 
social responsibility etc. involve problematics of waste and arbitrariness. However, while we thus 
claim that - at this particular level of analytical abstraction - both viruses have remained quite 
resistant to change over time, they should not be seen as determining what can be thought, said or 
done in any concrete organizational setting. By calling organizational viruses engines of 
management knowledge we have simply emphasized how both configurations generate descriptions 
or representations of organization and management but also that they are open to a great deal of 
variation in terms of the concrete social facts that emerge. There is much variation in terms of how 
the problem of arbitrariness is resolved, there are a multiplicity of concrete ways in which authority 
may be organized and a multiplicity of possible normative expectations. At the same time the 
bureaucratic virus, once having entered organizational self-descriptions tends to set things in motion 
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- in a particular direction. Similarly, scientific management is amendable to variation in terms of 
what problems of waste are formulated, what (scientific) rational arguments come to govern 
debates, what issues one learns about - but once one begins to compare actual activities with 
possible activities in a organization, a particular engine is set in motion. 
 
Inter-viral relations. The two viruses stand in a paradoxical relation to each other. On one hand, 
they seem to imply each other, in the sense that bureaucracy is thought to produce a space for 
rationality while assuming that rational rules have already been produced. In contrast scientific 
management produces temporal conceptions of organizations, i.e. as work processes and as on-
going rationalization. while always assuming an organizational space in which such a process 
unfolds. On the other hand, scientific management as a virus always implies a search for the 
potentials for improvement, thereby constantly threatening to set off new processes of 
rationalization, without regard for established and formalized rules, while bureaucracy will 
emphasize the avoidance of arbitrariness even at the cost of the rationality of particular rules. In 
fact, while Taylor dreamed of a final optimum, a perfected organizational space as the ultimate 
outcome of rationalization, today organizations are often judged as irrational and rigid, almost per 
se, if they are not able to imagine ever more efficient alternatives in an on-going and never-ending 
quest for improvement (e.g. Olsen and Brunsson (1993)). Most organizational self-descriptions are 
infected by both viruses thereby creating on-going strain and conflict between two possible 
fundamental directions of communication, conflicts that cannot be resolved without – for the time 
being or at a certain level – giving precedence to one or the other. 
 
Contagion. The analysis of the two viruses allows us to speculate about the question of contagion. 
What, one may ask, makes a virus contagious, and what has made these two particular viruses so 
contagious? Institutional analysts have emphasized legitimacy and uncertainty as two major 
preconditions for contagion, i.e. that some managerial ideas may have strong affinity with dominant 
notions of social order and progress, and that uncertainty makes it tempting for certain 
organizations to let themselves become infected by available ideas. Several researchers have also 
emphasized how modern management models are often open and relatively non-binding bodies of 
ideas (Røvik (1998, p. 47 ff) for an overview). Our analysis radicalizes this latter explanation. A 
virus is not an idea, i.e. a meaningful entity in itself, but rather constitutes a procedure that is not 
only amendable to almost any kind of issue, but also so void of content that it requires only a 
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minimum of attention and legitimization. While few may view bureaucracy as a legitimate solution 
as such, in normal situations it is "cheap" to challenge arbitrariness, and while few may want 
taylorist time studies today, it is hard to argue against improvement per se.  
 
Many issues remain to be dealt with in future studies of organizational viruses. One issue is the 
question of other viruses – besides the two analyzed above. We have suggested that bureaucracy 
entails spatial conceptualizations while scientific management entails temporal conceptualizations. 
Thus could be taken to suggest that that the two exhaust the logical possibilities of basic 
problematizations of organization (time versus space). However, new viruses could perhaps also be 
found in particular intersections of time and space, most notably what one could preliminarily 
describe as the virus of adaptation. The problem of adaptation, e.g. as found in stakeholder models, 
seems to operate in both dimensions simultaneously. However, it is still too early to make any more 
precise suggestions the basic distinctions involved in that virus.  
 
The terminology in itself may raise new issues to be dealt with. In some ways the terminology of 
organizational virology is as questionable as it is tempting in the sense that it also conjures up 
images of health, of immunization, of sickness and death. In other words, besides offering a fruitful 
ensemble of concepts for empirical analysis and discussion, the metaphor also seems to imply a host 
of normative issues. The most problematic related image is probably that of health, since it seems to 
imply, in its most simplistic form, healthy (sovereign) self-descriptions and organizations that have 
not yet been invaded by foreign viruses infecting, immediately or gradually, all parts of the 
organizational body. This is not the time nor place to address this complex issue, but suffice to say 
that we see viruses as necessary and constitutive of self-descriptions and not as something that can 
be done away with in some simple sense. Viral analysis may help us identify and discuss 
organizational viruses and may also enable us to see the openness of individual viruses, discern 
relations among viruses and consider explanations of contagion. However, it would seem to us that 
even a program of immunization contains viral elements (perhaps a virus of “hygiene”), and then in 
some sense the cure may be more dangerous than the decease. 
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